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RULE OF ETHICS OR SUBSTANTIVE LAW: WHO
CONTROLS AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO
CHOOSE A LAWYER IN TODAY'S CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENT

JOAN COLSON*

INTRODUCTION

"I wish we could get caught. We are a crooked company .. "' These
are the words of former Enron employee, Sherron Watkins, written in a2
memorandum to Kenneth Lay, Enron's Chairman of the Board of Directors.
At the time, Sherron Watkins did not know there were ethical rules that
effectively prevent law enforcement officials from interviewing employees
about potential crimes committed by the corporation; thus affording
corporations greater protections from getting caught.
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications, ImClone - it would be
extremely difficult these days to find a person in the United States who is not
aware of at least one, if not all, of these companies.3 Why? Because the
. J.D. Candidate, The John Marshall Law School, January 2007. I would like to
thank my colleagues at the U.S. Attorney's Office for their topic suggestions. I would also
like to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement.
1. Carolyn Said, Corporate Crusader; Enron Whistle-Blower Campaignsfor Moral
Values in Business, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 2002, at B1. Sherron Watkins, an accountant,
anonymously sent Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay a letter and 5-page memorandum after
realizing that the company's "off-the-books partnerships" were actually accounting fraud.
Id. Congressional investigators later leaked this memo to the press. Id.
2. Id. See also Penaltiesfor White-Collar Offenses: Are We Really Getting Tough on
Crime: Hearing of the Crimes and Drugs Subcomm. of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Asst. Att'y Gen., Criminal Division).
"[T]he CEO's of America somehow felt nobody was watching." Id.
3. See, e.g., Edward Iwata, Setbacks Won't Deter Prosecutionof White CollarCrime,
USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 2004, at 3B (discussing corporate scandals and the investigation
outcomes of their corporate officers); Carrie Johnson & Peter Behr, Charges Against
Enron 's Fastow to Change, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2002 at E03 (discussing Enron and
a seventy-eight count indictment against its former chief financial officer); Michael
Hedges, The Fall of Enron; Skilling Feeling the Heat; Ex-Enron CEO Expects Charges,
THE HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 11, 2002, at Al (discussing Enron and possible charges
against its former CEO stating that "Skilling reaped millions of dollars in compensation
while the company's true financial condition was unknown to stockholders"); Tom
Fowler, More Light May be Shed on Enron; Banker's Transactions Required Inside
Cooperation, Officials Say, THE HOUSTON CHRON., June 29, 2002, at 1 (discussing the
extended implications of Enron's hedge deals with various banks, who participated in a
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unethical accounting and corporate reporting practices of corporate
executives4 in these corporations cost investors "tens of billions of dollars"
since the end of 2001. 5 Enron alone cost investors approximately sixty
billion dollars. 6 At the time of its collapse on December 2, 2001, Enron, on
paper at least, was the seventh largest corporation in America. 7 As we now
know, Enron executives and accountants overstated its financial position by
hiding losses and various liabilities through inter-related companies, making
8
the company's financial position appear strong, when in fact, it was not.
When Enron finally restated its financial position in 2001, the numbers
showed that the company had falsely overstated its net income by
approximately fifty-nine billion dollars over a period of several years. 9
As a result of Enron and other corporate scandals that plagued the U.S.
financial markets in recent years,' 0 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

scheme to buy Enron stock). "The three British bankers.., netted a profit of $7.3 million
and split it three ways .... Id. The Enron executives "reaped nearly $8 million from the
deal" and "Fastow is reported to have earned $4.5 million from his investment." Id.
4. Alex Berenson, Market Watch; A Self-Inflicted Wound Aggravates Angst Over

Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, § 3, at 1 (discussing Enron and the difficulty of
accounting for assets and liabilities when they have been transferred to other related
companies); Hedges, supra note 3 (stating that "although the Enron investigation is
bewildering in its complexity, the goal of prosecutors when it comes to Skilling and other
top executives is straightforward," however, Enron accounting managers "reportedly told
investigators they believed Skilling knew about an effort to hide $500 million in Enron
losses in special purpose entities called the Raptors"); Iwata, supra note 3 (stating that
prosecutorial statistics include the former Big Five accounting firm of Arthur Anderson).
A Houston jury convicted the firm of obstruction ofjustice in 2002. Id.
5. See Iwata, supra note 3 (discussing the scandals of Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and
similar companies, and setting forth a status of corporate executives, whether pleading
guilty, found guilty, or awaiting trial).
6. Stephen

Labaton,

Enron's Collapse: The

S.E.C.

Chairman; Balancing

DeregulationandEnron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, § C, at 1.
7. The Role of the Enron Board in the Collapse of Enron Corporation:Hearingof the
Permanent Investigations Subcomm. of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong.

(2002) [hereinafter Levin Testimony] (testimony of Sen. Carl Levin). Senator Levin
discusses the prior position of Enron as a large conglomerate and industry leader. Id.
8. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Admits to OverstatingProfits

by About $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, § C, at 1. "In a filing with the S.E.C.,
Enron also indicated that part of last year's reported profits came from transactions with
partnerships controlled by Andrew S. Fastow, who was the company's chief financial
officer until he was ousted Oct. 24." Id.
9. Id. "In a sweeping restatement of its profits, Enron said that its actual net income
for the years 1997 to 2000 was $591 million less than it had reported on its financial
statements." Id.
10. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act Oversight: Hearing Before the Comm. on S. Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Donaldson Testimony]

(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission) (referencing the financial ups and downs of the financial markets from the
mid- 1990's to early 2000). Mr. Donaldson characterized the stock market price increases
and the dot com company phenomenon of the early to mid 90's as "new wealth." Id. The
expansion of new markets and changing investing habits of the public "brought millions of
individuals with their savings into our stock markets for the first time." Id.
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of 2002.11 The Act created, among other things, the Public Accounting
Oversight Board,12 which was designed to oversee accounting practices and
standards throughout the country.1 3 In addition, President Bush authorized,
by Executive Order, the formation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force 4 to
investigate and uncover white-collar crime.15 The Task Force was designed
to "increase the ability of agents and prosecutors to catch white collar
criminals."' 6 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the formation of the Corporate
Fraud Task Force was the government's response to wide-spread corporate
fraud. 17 Collectively, they were designed to prevent financial fraud by
establishing oversight of accounting practices.)
However, if prevention
failed, they were to provide law enforcement with the necessary tools to
investigate and prosecute violators. 9 In tandem, the government's actions
were intended to protect the public from becoming monetary casualties of
corporate greed.20 But do they? Considering the words of Sherron Watkins,
the answer is no.

11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 of the U.S. Code).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000) (setting forth, at part 5, that the term 'Board' means
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board); 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (establishing the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to "oversee the audit of public companies
that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests
of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and
independent audit reports").
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2000) (establishing the formulation and scope of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board).
14. White Collar Crime Penalties:HearingBefore the Comm. on Sen. Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Chertoff& Mercer Testimony] (statements of Michael Chertoff,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Criminal Division and William W. Mercer, U.S. Att'y, District of
Montana and Chairman, Att'y Gen.'s Advisory Comm. on S. Judiciary United States
Senate). According to the President, the Task Force was formed in order to "strengthen the
efforts of the federal government in its investigation and prosecution of financial crimes.
Id. "The Task Force will provide direction for the investigation and prosecution of white
collar crimes, including significant cases of securities fraud, accounting fraud, and other
financial and white-collar crimes." Id.
15. See id. (stating President Bush "sent a very clear message: that fraud, obstruction
of justice, and other types of criminal activity in the business world will not go unpunished
or receive merely a slap on the wrist...").
16. Chertoff& Mercer Testimony, supra note 14.
17. See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 10, at *2 (discussing the events that led to
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including the misconduct of business principles
and practices).
18. 15U.S.C.§7211.
19. See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 10 (referencing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 as "new tools" for the Commission to "further our enforcement mission"); Chertoff
& Mercer Testimony, supra note 14 (stating that the Corporate Fraud Task Force will
enhance the ability of federal law enforcement and federal prosecutors to take on large,
complex fraud cases).
20. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 10.
Mr. Donaldson notes that
"[c]ommunications, the explosion of information technology and changes in the culture of
equity investing, including the shift to more self directed retirement accounts, brought
millions of individuals with their savings into our stock markets for the first time." Id.
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Unless Congress reevaluates old ethics rules that prohibit law
enforcement from contacting employees of corporations that are under
investigation, many investigations of corporate fraud will continue to be
ineffective. 2' This Comment will focus on the no-contact provision of the
American Bar Association's Ethics Rule 4.222 as it is applied to federal
prosecutors investigating corporate fraud.
This Comment will begin by discussing the origins of the no-contact
rule and the reasons for its continued existence. Next, this Comment will
discuss the tenuous relationship that has formed over the years between the
American Bar Association and the United States Department of Justice
because of the differing views on how the no-contact rule should be applied
to federal prosecutors and in turn, federal law enforcement officials. This
Comment will also discuss the rights of a corporation as well as the rights of
an individual, and compare and contrast the effect the no-contact rule has on
both of them, individually and collectively.
For instance, should a
corporation be afforded more rights than an individual? Should the rights of
a corporation afford it the opportunity to thwart detection of criminal activity
at the expense of the public? Should an individual's constitutional rights be
subservient to a corporation's rights obtained through rules of ethics?
These are just a few important questions that have been at issue with
respect to the application of the no-contact rule to federal prosecutors. This
Comment will specifically address each issue, outlining the states' positions
regarding the applicability of the no-contact rule in various situations,
describing the substantive effect the no-contact rule has had on federal law
enforcement by creating large investigative barriers in contradiction to the
President and Congress's corporate fraud agenda, and discussing the
differences between ethics and substantive law. In addition, this Comment
will analyze the constitutionality of the no-contact rule with respect to
individuals, federal prosecutors, and law enforcement officers. Finally, this
Comment will set forth a proposal to limit or alleviate the extra protections
afforded corporations because of this ethics rule, which will, in turn,
reestablish an individual's right to choose whether to participate in catching
and prosecuting criminal activity in the corporate arena.
21. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary,and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1999, Amendment No. 11 offered By Mr. Hutchinson, House of
Representatives, August 5, 1998, at H7240 [hereinafter Hutchinson Amendment]
(statements of Mr. Hutchinson). Mr. Hutchinson expressed concern regarding conflicting
state ethics rules harming investigations by federal prosecutors. Id. Restrictions on
investigative techniques are also a concern following the passage of the Citizen's
Protection Act. Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the "American Criminal Class ": Why
Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 599, 61314(2004).
22.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002), states:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
to do so by law or a court order.
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I.
A

BACKGROUND

The ABA's No-Contact Rule

The American Bar Association (ABA) codifies rules that regulate
ethical conduct of lawyers in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 23
ABA Rule 4.2, entitled "Communication with Person
Represented by Counsel,', 24 is commonly referred to as the "no-contact" rule
or the "anti-contact" rule. 5 The no-contact rule states that a lawyer 26 can not
communicate with a person who they know to be represented by a lawyer
"about the subject of the representation" unless the lawyer gives consent or
the communication is authorized by law or by court order.27
With the growing number of corporate investigations,28 case law began
to evolve, distinguishing between employees that could or could not be

23. See generally id. (setting forth ethical and disciplinary rules for lawyers). The
ABA is a self-regulating agency. Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules
and FederalProsecutors: The ControversiesOver The Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 310 (1992). The ABA is a private association of lawyers that
accredit law schools and recommend to state and local bar associations rules and standards
to be considered for promulgation. Id. at 306. "There is strong evidence that lawyers
when they regulate themselves are inclined to take positions that favor the use of lawyers
and enhance their authority and prestige." Id. at 317. In addition, the no-contact rule
serves the interests of lawyers by allowing them to maintain control over information
disseminated to their clients. Id. at 325. Ethics rules almost never take into consideration
"the full range of interests that should govern the uneasy balance between effective law
enforcement and a defendant's procedural and substantive rights." Id. at 333.

24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct were originally adopted in 1983. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23,
at 300-01. Prior to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA promulgated the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 323. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility's version of Rule 4.2 was set forth in DR 7-104(A)(1) which stated:
During the course of his representation ofa client, a lawyer shall not: communicate
or cause another to communicate on the subjectof the representation by a lawyer in
that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorizedby law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(A)(1).

25. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 (1997)
(referring to Rule 4.2 as the no-contact rule); See also Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at
323 (referring to ABA Rule 4.2 as the anti-contact rule).
26. For purposes of the no-contact rule, a lawyer includes law enforcement personnel
if that person is acting on behalf of the lawyer. Organized and complex crimes require the
insurgence of federal prosecutors in a much earlier stage of the investigatory process than
ever before. Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The
Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 680 (1992). "When an
investigation is conducted largely through document subpoenas and grand jury
questioning, rather than through search warrants and street level interviews, the law
enforcement personnel involved are far more likely to be prosecutors than police officers."
Id.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).
28. DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS §1.1212] (2004).

From the 1970's to the 1990's, federal prosecutions rose from a few dozen per year to over
400 per year. Id.
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contacted pursuant to the no-contact rule.29 One factor in the courts'
reasoning was determining which employees were considered "adverse
parties., 30 As a result, the ABA ethics rules began to change with respect to
corporate employees.3' Currently, Comment 7 to Rule 4.2 specifically
addresses corporations and states in relevant part:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communication
with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs, or regularly
consults with the organization's lawyer ...or has authority to obligate the
organization with respect to the matter or whose acts or omissions in
to the organization for purposes of
connection with the matter
32 may be imputed
civil or criminal liability.

Rule 4.2, read in conjunction with Comment seven, bars contact with
constituents or persons regarding the subject matter under investigation who
may obligate the corporation in criminal matters.33
The original purposes of the no contact-rule was to: 1) "contribute[] to
the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has
chosen to be represented by a lawyer;, 34 2) "foster and protect legitimate
attorney-client relationships;, 35 and 3) "reduce[] the likelihood that clients
will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their
interests." 36 Each state bar association may choose to adopt the ABA rules
or to utilize alternate ethics rules.37 To date, every state has adopted Rule
29. Mark H. Aultman, The Story of a Rule, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 713, 722-23
(2000). The advent of various corporate structures has forced changes in the way rules
encompass the new forms. Id. Corporations are separate legal entities, but the corporation
can only act through its officers and employees agents, who may be potential witnesses.
Id. Early case law conferred substantive rights to corporations. Id. at 723.
30. Id.
31. Id. The 1969 Code of Profession Ethics underwent changes as a result of case law
forming as corporate structures were evolving. Id.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).
33. Id.
34. Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA's Revision of
Model Rule 4.2 (PartI), 70 TENN. L. REV. 121, 142 (2002). It is important to discuss the
reasons behind the rule in order to interpret the rule and evaluate it properly.
35. See id. at 142 (discussing Utah's comment to Rule 4.2). The rule guards "against
inequities that exists when a lawyer speaks to an untrained lay person." Id.
36. Id. The author compares the Utah Rule to that of Georgia. Georgia's rule purports
to serve
important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial
system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the
imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and a layperson; b) safe-guarding the
client-attorney relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that
all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel;
d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information
that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyer['s] ability to monitor
the case and effectively represent the client.
Id.
37. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 295. For example, California adopted the
California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2-100(C)(3) which states that "while
representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the
subject matter of the representation with a party the member knows to be represented by
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4.2, either in full or in part. 38 In addition, most federal courts have adopted
the applicable state or local rules of ethics.39
B.

The Beginning of the War: The Department of Justice Strikes Out
Against the No-Contact Rule

On June 8, 1989, then U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors 40 stating that the
Department's interpretation of the no-contact rule coincided with
constitutionally granted rights. It further stated that "contact with a
represented individual in the course of authorized law enforcement activity
does not violate [the no-contact rule]., 41 By invoking the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, Thornburgh reasoned that federal laws
should determine what activity is authorized with respect to federal
prosecutors.42 While acknowledging that states have the right to regulate
ethical conduct, Thomburgh relied on Supreme Court precedent in
concluding that states may regulate "federal attorneys only if the regulation
does not conflict with federal law or with the attorneys' federal
another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has the consent of the other lawyer."
United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 state that "[in representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorize[d] by law to do so." Weider Sports Equip. Co., v. Fitness First,Inc.,

912 F. Supp 502, 505 (D. Utah 1996). The Tenth Circuit holds that "party" implies an
adversarial proceeding and that as such, the no-contact rule does not apply pre-indictment.
Id. at 506-07.
38. Neals-Erik William Delker, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing
Conflict Over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to FederalAttorneys, 44 AM. U.L. REV

855, 858 (1995). Thirty-five states have adopted versions of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, while most of the remaining states have adopted versions of its
predecessor, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Cramton & Udell, supra note
23, at 323. However, the differences in lawyer's duties between states are rapidly
increasing. Id.
39. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 296.
40. Attorney General Thomburgh's memorandum issued a response to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Hammand, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1988). Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 319-20. The Second Circuit held that New
York's no-contact rule applied to federal prosecutors in the criminal context. Hammand,
858 F.2d at 838-39. The Second Circuit also refused to hold that the no-contact rule was
"coextensive with the sixth amendment." Id. at 837. Although the Second Circuit
recognized the fact that applying the no-contact rule to investigative matters may handcuff
law enforcement officials in obtaining evidence, the court urged restraint to prevent this
from happening. Id. at 838. The court was not persuaded by district court opinions that
refused to apply the no-contact rule during the investigatory stage of a case. Id. But see
United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "a number of
courts have held that there is no breach of a prosecutor's ethical duty to refrain from
communications with represented parties when investigating officers question or contact
suspects prior to their indictment").
41. Attorney General Richard Thoruburgh Memorandum, Reprinted in Hearingbefore
the Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Government Operations, 101st Cong. 289 (1990) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum].
42. Id.
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responsibilities. 43 Thornburgh reasoned that "where the Constitution of the
United States and federal law permit legitimate investigative contact, [the
ethics rule] does not present an obstacle." 4 The Attorney General further
backed up his position by arguing historical precedent, stating that "the
original comments on the Model Rules included language to the effect that
its prohibition against contacts with represented persons was not intended to
relate to certain established law enforcement techniques. ' ,
In 1994, following up on Thornburgh's memo, former Attorney
General Janet Reno promulgated 28 C.F.R., Part 77, which allowed federal
prosecutors to contact employees who were not "high level employee[s]
known by the government to be participating as a decision maker in the
determination of the organization's legal position. '46 However, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found 28 C.F.R., Part 77 to be unlawful
because the
47
Department had overstepped its "housekeeping" authority.,
In 1998, in response to the Department of Justice's attempt to exclude
federal prosecutors from each state's rules of ethics, Congress passed the
Citizens Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B, which was co-sponsored by
Congressman Joseph McDade 48 and is commonly referred to as the McDade
Amendment. 49 The Act states, in pertinent part:

43. Id. at 285 (citing Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379,402 (1963)).
44. Id. at 289. Attorney General Thornburgh was concerned with state ethics laws
impeding federal investigations that were authorized by the United States Constitution. Id.
45. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 318, n.85.
46. 28 C.F.R. Part 77, Fed. Reg. Vol. 59, No. 149 (1994).
47. United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252 (8th
Cir. 1988).
48. In 1992, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a five-count
indictment which alleged that Pennsylvania Congressman Joseph McDade illegally
accepted over $100,000 in gifts from officials and employees of United Chem Con in
exchange for government contracts. United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9703, at *2-3 (D. Pa. June 22, 1992). Congressman McDade was eventually
acquitted of all charges. See Eric Pianin, McDade Under Fire Despite Acquittal; EightYear Probe Took Its Toll on Congressman, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1996, at A31

(discussing the fact that Pennsylvania constituents knew the Congress and had faith in
him). "Frankly, I think he could have been convicted and still been reelected, said Len
Champney, a University of Scranton political science professor." Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000) states that:
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and
local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney
engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as
other attorneys in that State.
(b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice
to assure compliance with this section.
(c) As used in this section, the term attorney for the Government' includes any
attorney described in section 77.2(a) of part 77 of title 28 of the Code of Federal
Regulations and also includes any independent counsel, or employee of such a
counsel, appointed under chapter 40.
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(a)An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and
local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each state where such attorney
engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as
other attorneys in that State.5°
The Citizens Protection Act (CPA) specifically overrode Justice
Department regulations set forth in Title 28 C.F.R., Part 77,51 and subjected
federal prosecutors to all ethics rules in each state that the attorney conducts
business. 2
Although there has been much controversy over the application of the
no-contact rule to federal prosecutors in recent years,53 the rule has
undergone little change from its original 1909 predecessor.5 4 Even after
passing the CPA, in its 2002 revision to the no-contact rule, the ABA failed
to substantively alter it from its 1995 version.5 5 Specifically, the ABA
ignored the recommendations of the Conference of Chief Judges to address
56
its applicability and scope with respect to federal prosecutors, as well as

50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See id. (specifically discussing Title 28 C.F.R., Part 77, and ordering the Attorney
General to amend any rules to abide by part a of § 530B). The McDade Amendment
specifically targeted the Thornburgh memo and the Reno rule in its codification, leaving
no doubt that Congress was taking away any authority the Department of Justice believed
they had with respect to setting forth no-contact rules with respect to their employees. Id.
52. S. JudiciaryEthics Rules and FederalLaw Enforcement Officers: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on S. Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Smietanka Testimony]
(statement of John Smietanka, member, Michigan Attorney Discipline Board). Smietanka
was appointed Special Counsel to the Attorney General under William Barr. Id. He was
Special Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois during the
high-profile "El Rukris 1" prosecutions and is currently on the panel for the Michigan
Attorney Discipline Board. Id. In his opinion, "[t]he systematic pursuit of abuse of
governmental power began to become a national question with a series of National events:
Watergate, ABSCAM, the Mafia, the War on drugs, and the scandals of big business or
big labor gone amok." Id.
53. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 320.
54. Id. at 324-25. In 1909, the ABA promulgated its first rules of ethics, called the
Cannons of Professional Ethics. Id. Cannon 9 contained the first formal ABA no-contact
provision. Id. Since 1909, every set of ethics rules promulgated by the ABA, now
referred to as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, have included a no-contact
provision.
55. See Pierce, supra note 34, 122-38 (discussing the various drafts and
recommendations to ABA Rule 4.2). ABA Model Rule 4.2 changed the word "party" to
"person to make it clear the Rule applies beyond parties to litigation." Weider Sports
Equip. Co., 912 F. Supp at 506.
56. Pierce, supra note 34, at 121-22. In 1998, amidst the growing controversy over the
applicability of Rule 4.2 to federal prosecutors, the ABA's Commission on the Evaluation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Commission) began its review of Rule 4.2. Id. at
123-24. The Commission reviewed a discussion draft prepared by the Conference of
Chief Justices (COCJ), which consisted of state supreme court justices and representatives
of the U.S. Department of Justice. Id. The discussion draft was submitted to the ABA
Standing Committee and "contained numerous special provisions allowing communication
with represented persons by government lawyers engaged in criminal and civil law
enforcement matters." Id. at 126. Although the Chief Justices and the Department of
Justice representatives did not fully agree regarding the application of Rule 4.2 to federal
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separate recommendations submitted by the Department of Justice and
representatives of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics.57

II. WHY IS 18 U.S.C. § 530B AND ABA's RULE 4.2 IMPORTANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE?

The types of federal financial crimes being perpetrated by corporations
58
on the investing public in recent years have been very complex and costly.
Investigations of corporate activities have also become complex, often
involving multiple jurisdictions, 59 and necessitating the early involvement of
federal prosecutors to advise and partner with agents to identify various
criminal acts, criminal actors, and to make informed prosecutorial decisions
as the investigation evolves. 60 One essential investigatory tool frequently
used by all federal law enforcement officials is interviewing. 61 "When the
government is investigating possible corporate wrongdoing, an employee
may have information that is... harmful to the corporation.' '62 Talking to
individuals regarding the chain of events of a potential crime or
circumstances surrounding a particular occurrence is one of the most
effective means of gathering information about what happened from those
who may know.6 3

In the corporate environment, where the corporation and/or its
principals may have committed fraud, § 530B and ABA Rule 4.2 have
essentially taken the interviewing tool away from federal agents. 64 Although

prosecutors, "they both attempted to break a decade long impasse over the applicability of
Rule 4.2 to DOJ lawyers." Id. at 125.
57. Id. at 128-29. In 1998, the ABA Commission was given three draft proposals to
consider for its analysis and revisions to Rule 4.2. Id. at 129-30.
58. Levin Testimony, supra note 7. Senator Levin discusses the collapse of Enron,
with its stock dropping from approximately eighty dollars a share to almost nothing within
a ten month period. Id. Enron consisted of a large number of financial transactions that
were very complex. Id.
59. S. JudiciaryEthics Rules and FederalLaw Enforcement Officers: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on S. Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Justice Testimony]
(statement of John R. Justice, Circuit Solicitor of the Sixth Circuit of South Carolina). Mr.
Justice describes the adverse effects of the Citizens Protection Act on behalf of local
prosecutors. Id. He states that "the strength of the federal system of criminal justice are
those serious cases that necessitate investigations that cross state lines .... When the
'Citizens Protection Act' was introduced in the House the consequences for local
prosecutors would have been truly devastating." Id.
60. Id. Given the nature of complex cases, local prosecutors work with joint task
forces to combat federal crimes such as "drug trafficking, domestic terrorism, money
laundering, and other crimes that involve cross-jurisdictional efforts and interests." Id.
61. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 339. See also Thornburgh Memorandum,
supra note 41, at 286 (describing interviewing employees as a means of investigating
alleged False Claims Act violations).
62. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 339.
63. DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 9.02 at 1 (2004).
64. One view regarding the application of the no-contact rule to federal prosecutors is
a hybrid one. See Caroline Heck Miller, Knowing the DancerFrom the Dance: When the
Prosecutoris Punishedfor the Government's Conduct, 29 STETSON L. REV. 69, 85 (1999)
(comparing roles of federal prosecutors to other attorneys and law enforcement officials).
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interviewing individuals in the presence of corporate counsel is an option,
this option may not elicit completely honest or frank answers. As a result,
65
corporate investigations are being compromised.
During the late 1990s and into early 2000, while Enron and other large
66
federal law
corporations were participating in large-scale fraud,
enforcement officials, bound by the no-contact rule, lacked one of the most
effective means of protecting investors from being victimized by corporate
greed - the ability to conduct unimpeded interviews with employees like
Sherron Watkins.
III. DUAL RIGHTS: A CORPORATION'S RIGHTS VS. AN INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT TO CHOOSE
A.

An Individual'sFreedom to Choose

When a corporation is under investigation, the corporation has the right
to counsel. 67 One issue surrounding the applicability of the no-contact rule is
when, or if, the employee has any rights. If so, are those rights trumped by
the rights of the corporation? Arguably, the answer is yes. Using Enron as
an example, if federal officers wanted to speak to Sherron Watkins regarding
possible accounting irregularities at Enron, the no-contact rule essentially
would have barred such contact if the investigation was conducted with the
68anifEr
advice and assistance of federal prosecutors, and if Enron was represented
69
by counsel.

Miller concludes that federal prosecutors should be held to the ethical standards of law
enforcement personnel in some situations and attorneys in other situations. Id. at 87. For
instance, when federal prosecutors are acting in a police role, assisting in the investigation
of a corporation by advising law enforcement officials, the prosecutor should be treated

similar to a police officer. Id. When federal prosecutors function as attorneys, such as
when they participate in court proceedings, they should be treated as any other attorney,
"accountable to the additional ethical obligations of legal practice." Id.
65. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 296. "[A]gressive efforts by counsel for
corporations and potential defendants to expand its application... have created substantial
problems for law enforcement officials." Id.
66. See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 10 (referring to the fact that the economic

increases in the stock market halted in the second quarter of 2000). Mr. Donaldson
characterized the second quarter of 2000 as a bursting bubble. Id. This time period in
America's history was overcome by "the grossest displays of greed and malfeasance." Id.

67. United States v. O'Keefe, 961 F.Supp 1288, 1292 (E.D. Mo. 1997). Under the
theory of respondeat superior, liability may be imposed on a company by the acts of its
employees. Id.
68. See generally United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the applicability of the no-contact rule to all federal law enforcement
personnel).
69. See Miller, supra note 64, at 83 (discussing the fact that some corporations retain
lawyers to represent them).
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Most corporations are represented by counsel who are continuously on
retainer. 70 Thus, when a corporate lawyer claims "umbrella representation",71
of all employees, the employee is not choosing a lawyer, but rather, is having
one chosen for him or her. The lack of choice for most employees is
emphasized by the fact that the employee may not even know that the
corporate attorney is claiming to represent him or her.72 Corporations are
able to use retained counsel to prevent contact with employees by
investigators. 73 Abiding by the no-contact rule, federal officials may be
barred from even asking the employee if they wish to be represented by their
employer's attorney, or if they wish to speak.74
One important issue that exists in this scenario is that legally, the
corporate attorney, does not actually represent the individual, but instead
represents the client corporation. 75 Therefore, the employee is deemed to be
represented for purposes of the no-contact rule only, and is not actually
represented as an individual.76 Ironically, two of the reasons behind the
original promulgation of the no-contact rule are to protect individuals who
have chosen lawyers and to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege; however, the no-contact rule in the corporate context does not
address these concerns. As an individual, an employee cannot effectively
choose a lawyer if she does not know that she is represented. And because
they are not represented, the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege is
irrelevant if the attorney's actual client is the corporation.77 In addition,
"umbrella representation" applicable to an employee is not representation of
the individual at all, but serves to insulate corporations against investigation
by controlling the release of potentially harmful information and preventing
government officials from effectively investigating crimes. 78
B. An Individual'sFirstAmendment Right to Freedom of Speech
The express language of the no-contact rule appears to make the rule
70. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 41, at 289. Attorney General Thornburgh

expressed the Department of Justices' view that many corporations have "counsel
continuously on retainer, which counsel claims to represent all employees on all corporate
matters.. ."ld. This creates a "difficult situation" and probably runs afoul of a true
attorney client relationship. Id.
71. See Smietanka Testimony, supra note 52, at *2 (discussing the fact that some

corporate attorneys make claims of blanket or umbrella representation with respect to all
employees of a company under investigation).
72. Karlan, supra note 26, at 701.
73. Id.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).

75. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 339-40. Corporate attorneys represent their
clients, the corporation. Therefore, the concern with protecting the attorney-client
relationship appears to be an excuse for lawyers to control information to "potential or
actual adversaries." Id. "A prosecutor is under the obligation not to speak" because they
may disadvantage the represented party. Delker, supra note 38, at 903.
76. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 339-40.
77. Id. at 341.
78. Id.
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applicable even in situations where the employee voluntarily approaches the
79
government with information of wrong-doing on behalf of the corporation.
For example, if Sherron Watkins went to the United States Attorney's Office
to inform them of accounting irregularities, the Assistant U.S. Attorney may
80
be barred from speaking to her. In this example, an ethics rule effectively
8
trumps as individual's First Amendment right of free speech. '
83
82
In a post-Miranda world - a world that also includes the Fifth,
85
84
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution - a
person has the constitutionally granted right to choose not to speak to law
enforcement agents. A person has a right to say "I have a lawyer," "I want a
lawyer," or "I do not want to speak." However, if a person wishes to speak
86
An
out, they have a personal right under the First Amendment to do so.
employee should be afforded the opportunity to exercise his or her
constitutionally granted rights to speak or not to speak.

79. Id. at 341-42. Although constitutional rights may be waived, a lawyer's ethical
obligations may not be waived by the client. Id. Only the lawyer may waive this right. Id.
See also John G. Douglas, Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: Jimmy Hoffa 's Revenge:
White Collar Rights Under the McDade Amendment, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J.

123, 138-39 (2002) (describing this approach as "paternalistic"). But see United States v.
Talao, 222 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that conflict of interest concerns gives an
individual the right to approach government officials without corporate counsel if the
prosecutor advises the individual of their rights to be represented).
80. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 341-42.
81. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). "[T]he First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." Id. (citations omitted).
82. Miranda warnings serve to protect individuals from incriminating themselves with
respect to a crime. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). This "Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves." Id. at 467. "In order
to... permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored." Id.
83. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part,
"[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
84. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part,
that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
85. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states

that,

[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... " Id.
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Although a person chooses to be associated with a company through
employment, that association should not trump the individual's right to
speak. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, the United States Supreme
Court held that "freedom of association protected by the First Amendment
does not extend to joining with others for the purpose of depriving third
parties of their lawful rights."87 Therefore, although an individual has
chosen to be an employee of a particular corporation, the corporation should
not be able to quash the individual's rights to free speech, especially not
through a rule of ethics.
One option open to law enforcement personnel working with federal
prosecutors that does not violate the no-contact rule is to request, via
corporate counsel, to interview a particular employee.88 In representing the
corporation, the lawyer has a right to consent to the contact and be present
for the interview, 89 even though the corporate lawyer should notify the
employee that he does not represent him or her personally. 90
One overwhelming element of human nature is that employees
invariably wish to remain employed. 9' Therefore, a corporate lawyer who
does not represent the individual employee but is present at the interview,
listening to the questions asked and the answers given regarding the
corporation itself, hampers the legitimacy of the interview and makes the
interviewing process counter-productive.92 It is unlikely that the employee is
going to say anything derogatory about the corporation, his or her supervisor,
or other high-level corporate individuals in the presence of the corporate

87. Madsen, 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).

89. Id.
90. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. (1983) (acknowledging that

"[c]are must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such
adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation
for that constituent individual").
91. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 340. See also Hearing of the Crime and Drugs
Subcomm. of the S. JudiciaryComm.: Subject Penaltiesfor White CollarOffenses: Are We
Really Getting Tough on Crime?, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Devine Testimony]
(statement of Tom Devine, Legal Director, Government Accountability Project)
(discussing the importance of whistleblowers to federal investigators and prosecutors).
Mr. Devine describes whistleblowers as the "Achilles heel of... corruption." Id. Mr.
Devine also describes Sherron Watkins, the Enron executive, as a "corporate Paul
Revere". Id.
92. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 340. "[T]he presence of corporate counsel...
may deter employees who wish to cooperate due to fear that retaliation will flow from the

provision of information." Id. Congress recognized the importance of anonymity with
respect to corporate employees when enacting laws such as the whistle-blower statute, but
failed to recognize the same need for anonymity when enacting the McDade Amendment.
See Devine Testimony, supra note 91 (discussing the whistle-blower statute). Employees

should not fear retaliation from corporate executives via the information the executives
receive through corporate counsel. Id.
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attorney. 93 Because the attorney represents the corporation, the attorney is
94
obligated to repeat what he or she heard during the interview. In this type
of situation, the no-contact rule effectively places an employee in the
difficult position of not speaking at all or of speaking in front of corporate
95
counsel and having to face possible retaliation from the employer.
According to Comment 7 to Rule 4.2, one reason for the no-contact
rule in the corporate context is to protect the corporation by decreasing the
chances that someone will disclose privileged information or disclose
96
information that may be harmful to the corporation's interests. Because of
the potential liability to corporations for the disclosure of information from
employees, proponents of the no-contact rule continue to advocate that
federal prosecutors should be barred from contacting some, if not all,
employees. 97 Although many states have adopted no-contact rules that have
98
attempted to limit which employees fall under the no-contact rule, some

93. See generally Devine Testimony, supra note 91 (discussing the fact that
whistleblowers face retaliation from employers). "[T]he norm is that whistleblowers
[T]here are several hundred
proceed at their own risk when sounding the alarm....
whistleblowers who... are openly fired for disloyalty, for disloyalty to company managers
whom themselves often were breaching their fiduciary duty to the shareholders." Id. Mr.
Devine noted that Sherron Watkins, the former Enron executive who wrote an anonymous
letter describing some of Enron's potential accounting problems, "only survived because
Enron collapsed before retaliation could be carried out." Id.
94. Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21, at H7238. Congressman Hutchinson
discussed a common problem with conflict of interest issues by using an example of a drug
dealer.
If you arrest a low level drug dealer in the State, the kingpin can hire a lawyer for
that low level drug dealer and as a prosecutor, you cannot talk to that low level drug
dealer without that lawyer being present who is actually hired by the kingpin. You
know what plays out in that situation. If that person talks to you, he may well be
dead the next day.
Id. Although corporate crime may be considered less violent than crimes committed by
drug dealers and drug kingpins, Congressman Hutchinson's point is still valid with respect
to an employee's fear of retribution by their employer if they speak negatively about their
employer in front of the corporation's counsel.
95. See Devine Testimony, supra note 91 (discussing the ramifications of
whistleblowers). "Legislators of both parties have historically lionized whistleblowers and
chastised those who violated their duty by remaining silent.... But the rhetoric rings
hollow to someone who is fired and facing bankruptcy for warning a corporation of that
same risk." Id. Although whistleblowers generally do so anonymously, the employee has
no anonymity when speaking to a federal agent while a corporate attorney is present. Id.
Although the ramifications, as described by Mr. Devine, regarding retaliation for
whistleblowers are severe, they do not compare to the fear of individuals who have to face
corporate lawyers and their employers while speaking, or in effect not speaking, to federal
investigators. Id.
96. Karlan, supra note 26, at 701. If the no-contact rule is read literally, law
enforcement objectives would obviously be impeded with respect to complex crimes. Id.
97. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 355 n.267. Florida has effectively abolished
the "authorized by law" provision of the no-contact rule by banning contact with all
current and former employees. Id.
98. Aultman, supra note 29, at 735. The definition of represented persons or parties
has changed over time. Initially, corporations tried to establish that contact with all
salaried employees was prohibited. Id. However, this approach appeared too broad, so
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states, like Florida, have interpreted the no-contact provisions broadly and
have effectively extended the ban to include not only all current employees
but former employees as well. 99
Although a corporation's interest to prevent disclosure of harmful
information is an important one, it is an interest that is not afforded to
individuals. Consider an individual under investigation for mail fraud, which
is a federal offense. Even after the right to counsel attaches, whether through
the Fifth1°0 or Sixth Amendment, 1 1 federal prosecutors investigating a
federal crime are not barred from attempting to interview the individual's
best friend just because the information the friend may convey is harmful to
the person being investigated.
The no-contact rule, as applied in the corporate context, effectively
extends extra rights to a corporation by shielding its employees from
questioning.' 0 2 By shielding a corporation from scrutiny at the employee
level, the no-contact rule acts contrary to this country's stated public policy
objectives: to protect the public from unscrupulous business practices by
identifying and prosecuting corporate criminal activity. 0 3
C.

Conflict of Interest Concerns

The no-contact rule places corporate lawyers in conflicting positions
with regard to the corporation's interests and the individual's interests. 104
some courts adopted the prohibition of contacting a corporation's "control group" or those
with managerial authority, because both of theses groups were deemed able to "bind the
company". Id. Other courts prohibited contacting employees who were "implementing
the advice of counsel.... These prohibitions, if taken literally, would effectively insulate
corporations from any investigations that are not initiated through formal discovery
proceedings." Id. One court held that "a middle management level employee with no
authority to commit the organization to a position regarding the subject matter of the
litigation could be contacted [because] this reading of the rule was necessary to ensure that
Rule 4.2 remains a rule of ethics, rather than of corporate immunity." Id. at 736.
99. Cramtom & Udell, supra note 23, at 355 n.267.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
102. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 339-40. The purpose of the no-contact rule
seems to be "burdening the government's access to information." Id. at 340.
103. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 10 at *3. The government needs to take
measures to improve public confidence to the financial markets. Id.
104. Wood v Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-71 (1981). Conflict of interest concerns were
present when a lawyer was hired by a person's employer. Id. There are "inherent dangers
that arise when a criminal defendant is represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third
party, particularly when a third party is the operator of the alleged criminal enterprise." Id.
at 268-69. "One risk is that the lawyer will prevent his client from obtaining leniency by
preventing the client from offering testimony against his former employer or from taking
other actions contrary to the employer's interest." Id. See also Smietanka Testimony,
supra note 52, at *2 (describing potential conflicts of interest for counsel which may be
forced upon another by an employer).
Take the case of the member of an organized criminal venture who wants to
cooperate with the government, but has an attorney not of his choosing publicly
representing him. The dilema: if he tells the attorney he wants to cooperate or plea
bargain with the government, he risks injury to his family or himself.
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According to the United States Supreme Court, "[s]ince a lawyer must
always be free to exercise his professional judgment without regard to the
interests or motives of a third person, the lawyer who is employed by one to
represent another must constantly guard against erosion of his professional
freedom."1 °5
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE No-CONTACT RULE AS "AUTHORIZED BY LAW"
A.

In General

Although ABA Rule 4.2 sets forth the general no-contact provisions,
the rule also states that contact is not prohibited if a lawyer is "authorized by
10 7
'10 6
the
In United States v. Lopez,
law to do so or by court order."

Department of Justice argued that investigations conducted with respect to
federal crimes are, in and of themselves, authorized by federal statutes and
1 08
as "authorized by law."
are therefore exceptions to the no-contact rule
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed in Lopez, stating that federal

statutes were "generally enabling statutes" and that there needed to be an

express or implied authority to exempt federal prosecutors pursuant to the
"authorized by law" exception to California's no-contact rule.10

9

However,

some courts have applied the "authorized by law" exception for
investigations only in situations where there is ongoing criminal activity
because "[e]thics rules prohibit a lawyer from assisting a client with criminal
110

conduct."

B.

Undercover Operations

Most states have decided that undercover investigations are exempt
'1 1
In United States v.
from the no-contact rule as "authorized by law."
105. Wood, 450 U.S. at 271 (citing

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-23

(1980)). The ABA Code also states that "[a] person or organization that pays or furnishes
lawyers to represent others possesses a potential power to exert strong pressures against
the independent judgment of those lawyers." Id. However, the ABA seems to be picking
sides on the representation matter. On one hand, ABA Rule 4.2 prohibits contact by one
lawyer to a party represented by another lawyer. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.2, (discussing the no-contact rule). On the other hand, the ABA recognizes a
potential conflict of interest, but merely acknowledges the fact that they recognize this
conflict and warns lawyers of the potential. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.2, with MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-23 (1980)
(establishing the ABA's positions with respect to the no-contact rule and conflict of
interest concerns).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).
107. 765 F.Supp 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993),
amended and superceded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
108. Delker, supra note 38, at 868.
109. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032.
110. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 337. The no-contact rule applies to "specific,
past crimes." Id.
111. United States v Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1993). "The dullest
imagination can comprehend the devastating effect that such a rule would have on
undercover operations." Id.
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Ryans, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Rule 4.2 "was not
intended to preclude undercover investigations of unindicted suspects merely
because they have retained counsel." ' 1 2 Therefore, according to Ryans,
taping a conversation with an employee during an undercover investigation
may be "authorized by law" for purposes of the no-contact rule, but a federal
agent overtly approaching an employee and providing them with all the
constitutional freedoms of choosing not to speak, is not "authorized by
law."' 13 This rationale seems to conflict with personal rights, personal
freedoms, and stated public policy.
V. INCONSISTENT RULES FOR FEDERAL MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS IMPEDES THE ABILITY TO INVESTIGATE COMPLEX CRIMES

With respect to the application of the no-contact rule, lack of
uniformity between states is problematic for federal prosecutors." 4 The
varying interpretations of the no-contact rule can be found in areas pertaining
to which employees are exempt, whether federal prosecutors may speak to an
employee who approaches the government, and which law enforcement
activities may be "authorized by law.'115 The lack of uniformity is also
problematic for federal prosecutors because many investigations involving
16
federal white-collar crime extend beyond state lines."
For some cases, a prosecution team is formed, which may include an
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) and law enforcement personnel
from different agencies and areas of the country. 1 7 The AUSA's may be
admitted to different state bar associations. 18 As a result, attorneys working

112. 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1990). The court considered the ramifications of
Rule 4.2 to covert operations and concluded that applying the rule would "stymie
undercover operations" and "hamper... legitimate investigations." Id. (citations omitted).
113. United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1982). The Vasquez court noted
that by not excluding undercover operations, the unintended result would enable criminals
to potentially circumvent a legitimate investigation. Id. at 17.
114. 28 C.F.R. Part 77.
115. Id.
116. Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21, at H7238. Congressman Bryant used the
Oklahoma City bombing as an example of an investigation and prosecution that
encompassed lawyers and investigators from throughout the United States. Id. According
to Congressman Bryant, "in that investigation, [prosecutors and investigators] gathered
evidence in Michigan and New York and other states and brought that together in
Oklahoma City for coordination." Id. The non-uniformity of various state rules hampers
legitimate multi-jurisdictional law enforcement investigations. Id.
117. Chertoff & Mercer Testimony, supra note 14, at *2. The Corporate fraud task
force, chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, will include U.S. Attorneys from various
large cities throughout the United States. Id.
118. See Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21, at H7240 (describing the problems
with multi-state investigations coupled with non-uniform rules).
In the multistate investigations we have, when you are traveling down to Florida to
interview a witness, when you are going to Louisiana, when you have multi-states
involved, you have conflicting laws with different states. My good friend from
Massachusetts has some very stringent bar rules that are in conflict with the ethics
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on the same case "may be subject to substantially different rules."119
addition, although most circuits agree that Rule 4.2 applies to criminal
cases, 120 not all courts agree as to whether the rule applies to undercover
operations pre-indictment.121
The result of varying rules between jurisdictions for federal
prosecutors, who many times deal with multi-jurisdictional cases, is an
impediment to legitimate, substantive investigations. 122 The more complex
the investigation, the greater the need for uniformity in interviewing
witnesses and gathering evidence.' 23 If a discrepancy exists or it is unclear
as to whether contact may be deemed "ethical," the practice has been to
forego employee interviews and potentially compromise investigative
results. 24 "[T]he risk of disciplinary sanction is great enough that a
prosecutor counseling police officers in their conduct ...might well advise
of the
them to forego [contact] .... The loser is the client, who is deprived
2' 5
benefit of statements law enforcement agents might have obtained.'

VI. ETHICS OR SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Defense attorneys began threatening federal prosecutors with state
disciplinary actions for violations of the no-contact provisions. 26 As a
laws in our State and hamstring what a prosecutor might be trying to do and what
could be perceived as unfair.
Id.
119. See 28 C.F.R. Part 77 (outlining the jurisdictional difficulties of investigating
crime under Rule 4.2). As an example, the Department of Justice Regulations discuss the
situation in which varying jurisdictions may have completely different results. "Indeed,
one member of a two-member federal prosecution team could receive a commendation for
effective law enforcement while the other member, licensed in a different state, might be
subject to state discipline for the same conduct." Id.
But see Vasquez, 675 F.2d at 17 (doubting the
120. Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739.
applicability of Rule 4.2 to criminal matters).
121. United States v. Grass, 239 F.Supp 2d 535, 541 (M.D. Penn. 2003). The Second
Circuit disagrees with all other circuits that have "held that the no-contact rule does not
prevent non-custodial pre-indictment communications by undercover agents with
represented parties." Id.
122. Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21, at H7238. To add more confusion as to
whom a federal prosecutor may or may not speak with, the O'Keefe court stated that
"because the statements of some of defendant's former employees may subject defendant
to liability, the Court agrees with defendant that some limits should be placed on the
Government's access to these employees." O'Keefe, 961 F.Supp. at 1295.
123. HutchinsonAmendment, supra note 21, at H7238.
124. See 28 C.F.R. Part 77 (discussing the practical effects of the possibility of violating
Rule 4.2).
The threat of disciplinary proceedings (and the possible resulting loss of license and
livelihood) against a government attorney engaged in legitimate law enforcement
activities has had a chilling effect on the responsible exercise of law enforcement
duties. Many federal prosecutors.., stated that they feel compelled to refrain from
authorizing or participating in legitimate and ethical law enforcement
activities ......
Id.
125. Miller, supra note 64, at 82.
126. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 318 n.85. The practices of the Department of
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result, the Department of Justice issued an opinion via the Thornburgh
Memorandum stating that since each federal criminal case involved federal
27
prosecutors applying federal law in a federal court, the Supremacy Clause1
trumped state rules of ethics. 28 However, federal courts' adoption of state
and local ethics rules, as well as the passage of the CPA, arguably makes the
Supremacy Clause inapplicable. 129 However, legal scholars agree that the nocontact rule was "not intended to apply to the investigatory activities of law
enforcement officials," 130 especially in the criminal context,13132 and that
sound public policy dictates a need to have uniform federal rules.
Most federal courts, however, continue to hold that the no-contact rule
is applicable to federal prosecutors, 33 and continue to recognize their ability
to sanction prosecutors for violations of ethics rules. 134 But at the same time,
most federal courts are "reluctant to apply an exclusionary rule" for
35
violations unless the violation is one of constitutional proportions.'
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until
adversarial proceedings commence, 136 and Fifth Amendment rights to
counsel attach in a custodial setting, 137 constitutional safeguards are
generally not implicated when the no-contact rule is violated.
When constitutional safeguards remain unaffected, "a majority of
courts are unwilling to allow the ethics rule to be used by defense attorneys
as substantive law."' 138 "Thus, to some extent, [federal courts] have aligned
the no-contact rule with constitutional restraints imposed under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.' ' 139 However, even though federal courts have not
applied the exclusionary rule for violations of the no-contact rule, state bar
agencies may nevertheless impose sanctions on federal lawyers. 40 For
example, federal prosecutors, abiding by all federal laws in conducting their
jobs, may nevertheless be sanctioned by a state bar agency for ethical

Justice coexisted peacefully with the no-contact rule until defense attorneys began using it
as a tactic to threaten a federal prosecutor. 1d.
127. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
128. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 41.
129. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23 at 354.
130. In re John Doe, 801 F.Supp 478, 485 (Dist. N.M. 1992). In In re Doe, the
constitutionality question pertaining to the McDade Amendment focused on whether ABA
ethical rules should be applied to federal prosecutors as a whole. Id. The court held that
federal prosecutors should, in fact, abide by ethical standards. Id.
131. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 326.
132. Id. at319.
133. Delker, supra note 38, at 878. All federal prosecutors must be members of a state
bar. Id. States have regulatory and licensing power over their members. Id.
134. Id. at 885. The Supreme Court has granted federal courts the power to control
attorneys that practice before them. Id.
135. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 348.
136. Id. at 328.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 348.
139. Karlan, supra note 26, at 703.
140. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 370.
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violations. Therefore, the practical implication of the no-contact rule is to
halt or impede federal enforcement of federal crimes;' 4 1 thereby acting as
substantive law, 142 not solely a rule of ethics.
VII. HOW

TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE MCDADE AMENDMENT

None of the original reasons for the adoption of the CPA (McDade
Amendment) are actually addressed or solved by Rule 4.2 or the CPA
(McDade Amendment). The no-contact rule does not address Department
"leaks"' 143 of information or unwarranted, costly prosecutions. These "leaks"
The no-contact rule,
concerned Congressman McDade the most.'"
applicable through the CPA, governs the point at which law enforcement
officials may interview employees of a corporation under investigation.
There have been vast changes in the world since the original adoption
of the Cannons of Ethics in 1909. However, the no-contact rule has
undergone only minor changes. 145 The application of the no-contact rule in
today's corporate environment overly protects corporations from being
subjected to meaningful investigation and prosecution. Such a result is
adverse to subsequent laws enacted by Congress, such as the SarbanesOxley Act. 14 6 Therefore, the no-contact provisions, as applied through the
CPA, have been implicitly preempted 47by subsequent congressional
legislation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Therefore, Congress should explicitly abolish the no-contact rule as
applied to employees of a corporation in light of subsequent laws and the
President and Congress' more recent stated public policy objectives.
Alternatively, Congress should recognize that the employee no-contact
provisions of Rule 4.2, as applied through the CPA, acts as substantive law
and should amend the CPA to exempt federal prosecutors from the nocontact rule while conducting federal crime investigations.
A third recommendation is for Congress to promulgate its own nocontact rule to be applied to federal prosecutors consistent with the right to
counsel provisions of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. The practical effect of any of these

141. Miller, supra note 64, at 82. "[T]he risk of disciplinary sanction is great enough
that a prosecutor counseling police officers in their conduct.., might well advise them to
forego [contact] .... The loser is the client, who is deprived of the benefit of statements
law enforcement agents might have obtained." Id.
142. Id. at 91. Miller cautions that history shows that bar rules may quickly become
substantive law. Id.
143. Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21, at H7244.
144. Id.
145. Pierce, supra note 34, at 138.
146. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
147. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). Without
explicit preemptive language, conflict preemption, which is a form of implied preemption,
exists "where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).
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recommendations is to usurp the ABA rule and its state progenies, 148 thereby
restricting state power to dictate and impede the actions of federal
prosecutors and agents.
Recognizing the implied preemption of the no-contact rule or expressly
exempting federal prosecutors from the no-contact rule acknowledges the
fact that federal prosecutors are different than most other lawyers 149 because
they routinely participate in multi-jurisdictional investigations 15 that can
only be conducted efficiently and effectively with a uniform rule of
conduct. 151 An exemption or recognized preemption will also indicate
Congress's recognition of the fact that protecting a corporation from
investigation does not outweigh an individual's rights in the corporate
environment; namely, the right to freedom of speech and the right to have a
lawyer of their choice. 152 In addition, the need for federal prosecutors to be
able to conduct or participate in both overt and covert operations is
tantamount to the administration ofjustice.
However, there are some legitimate concerns that, if gone unchecked,
federal prosecutors may act unethically.1 53 Certainly, no one questions the
54
fact that errors in judgment sometimes occur at the prosecutorial level.1
However, the Department of Justice has formal disciplinary proceedings set
up to address concerns regarding the conduct of its employees.' 5 5 The
Department's internal procedures for employee misconduct addresses
56
legitimate ethical issues that may arise. 1

148. Uniformity of rules for federal prosecutors is extremely important given the multijurisdictional component of federal law enforcement. Hutchinson Amendment, supra note
21, at H7240.
149. See generally Miller, supra note 64, at 70-71 (outlining how federal prosecutors
are unique).
150. See Miller, supra note 64, at 88 (discussing the effect the McDade Amendment had
on the existing Department of Justice Regulations concerning ethics). The CPA was
clearly intended to stop the Department of Justice from exempting federal prosecutors
from the no-contact rule. Id. The CPA was also "a Congressional rejection of the
proposition that prosecutors should be treated differently from other attorneys." Id.
151. See Smietanka Testimony, supra note 52, at *2 (discussing unique problems faced
by federal prosecutors such as the advent of corporate and union investigations and
attorney claims of "umbrella representation for all members of the body").
152. See generallyMiranda, 384 U.S. 436 (protecting an individual from incriminating
themselves).
153. See Hearing Before the House Appropriations Comm. Subcomm. Commerce,
Justice and State, and the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1998) (prepared statement of Gerald B.
Lefcourt, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (describing the need to
contain "the unfettered power of federal prosecutors and the dangers posed by ethical,
abusive and improper conduct by U.S. Department of Justice employees").
154. Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21.
155. Former Attorneys General Thornburgh and Reno attempted to promulgate nocontact rules for Assistant United States Attorney's. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra
note 41.
156. See generally Hutchinson Amendment, supra note 21, at H7234 (discussing the
Department's procedures for handling attorney misconduct). "There are mechanisms
already in place to address prosecutorial abuse and prosecutorial misconduct." Id.
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Over the past several years, corporate fraud has resulted in billions of
dollars in losses to the investing public.'57 Although Congress is addressing
the need for tough and accurate financial reporting, it is time that Congress
announces clearly and loudly that corporate fraud will not flourish in the
future. Congress has the obligation to the public to rectify any prior
58
inconsistent laws that may serve as an impediment to law enforcement.1
The public deserves laws that prevent fraud, and to the extent that federal
laws do not violate constitutional rights, they should be designed to promote
individual rights over the corporation, and protect the public from corporate
wrong-doing.
The CPA (McDade Amendment), as currently written, contradicts
legislative intent to protect the public. 59 Congress should expressly
acknowledge that the McDade Amendment, as applied to the no-contact rule,
has been implicitly preempted by subsequent laws and Presidential
Executive Orders designed to give federal law enforcement the tools
necessary to investigate and prosecute corporate fraud. Alternatively,
Congress should explicitly exempt federal prosecutors from the no-contact
rule or rewrite the no-contact rule to allow for the employee to choose
whether to accept representation from a corporate lawyer or another lawyer
of their choice. These changes will give a proper balance to the rights of the
corporation, the rights of the individual, and the rights of the public in being
protected by corporate fraud.
CONCLUSION

The Citizens Protection Act of 1998 was hastily enacted as a rider to a
1998 Omnibus Appropriations Bill. 160 It mandates that federal prosecutors
are bound by state and federal ethics rules. ABA Rule 4.2 contains what is
commonly referred to as the no-contact or anti-contact rule. Most states
have adopted ethics rules similar to that of Rule 4.2.

157. See Iwata, supra note 3 (discussing various corporate fraud cases resulting in
billions of dollars of loss to the investing public. Id.
158. In reDoe, 801 F.Supp at 485.
In order for a Supremacy Clause defense to arise.... there must be a conflict
between a federal prosecutor's duties under federal law and his duties under state
law. A conflict arises when.., state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Id.
159. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23, at 316. Substantive and procedural rights should
not vary between states when federal law is involved. Id. "Any deference accorded to
state law or to local federal district court rules should serve important public purposes and
not really random choices of federal judges in choosing the ethics rule adopted by
reference in local court rules." Id.
160. See S. Judiciary Ethics Rules and Federal Law Enforcement Officers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Richard L. Delonis, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Assistant Senate Judiciary Ethics Rules and
Federal Law Enforcement Officers) (discussing the fact that the Citizens Protection Act
was attached to an omnibus bill which was "hurriedly enacted in the closing moments of
the last Congress").
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Rule 4.2 serves to protect corporations from meaningful investigation
into allegations of wrong-doing by prohibiting federal prosecutors or federal
law enforcement officials when working with federal prosecutors, from
contacting employees without first contacting the corporate attorney and
allowing the corporate attorney the opportunity to be present during any
interview or conversation with federal law enforcement officials. Although
states have defined the no-contact rule in various ways, the rule's nonuniformity coupled with the existence of multi-jurisdictional investigations
poses a problem that is unique to federal prosecutors. 16t In addition, because
Congress has subsequently enacted laws to protect the public from fraudulent
corporate activity and because these laws contradict the effect that the CPA
has on law enforcement activities, the no-contact rule, as applied through the
CPA, should be void as having been preempted by subsequent congressional
laws.
The continued existence of the CPA is contrary to current public
policies and personal freedoms. An individual, who is also an employee,
must be free to choose to speak to the government without the corporation's
counsel present. An individual's right to speak to the government without an
attorney must be outweighed by a corporation's need to keep any potential
illegal activity secret. An individual's fear of losing their job must not be in
direct conflict with legitimate law enforcement investigations. A law
enforcement official should not, by an ethical rule, be able to place an
employee in the situation of being threatened by coercive or retaliatory
measures, even if these threats are unspoken. An ethics rule, which expands
the constitutional definition of the right to counsel, should not be able hold a
federal prosecutor hostage in his or her job, forcing him or her to forego
otherwise legitimate investigative techniques at the expense ofjustice.
Laws that put corporate needs before the Bill of Rights and the
President's agenda to deter, uncover, and/or punish those found to have
committed white-collar crime, are not ethical in nature, but are actually
substantive law that affects the federal process.
The Citizens Protection Act should be abolished. Alternatively, it
should be rewritten to afford both individuals and corporations a level
playing field with respect to the rights they are afforded, taking into account
the policy concerns of protecting the public from unscrupulous business
practices.

161. Cramton & Udell, supra note 23 at 316. "Larger issues of substantive justice are
involved: the effective, efficient, and uniform enforcement of regulatory and criminal
statutes, and the constitutional allocation of lawmaking authority." Id.

